which one item is for sale. In the first-round of the auction, buyers bid in an ascending-bid auction. The two buyers with the highest bids proceed to the second round.

which one item is for sale. In the first-round of the auction, buyers bid in an ascending-bid auction. The two buyers with the highest bids proceed to the second round. In the second round, the two remaining buyers submit sealed bids (that cannot be lower than the price at which the bidding stopped in the first round) and the buyer with the highest bid wins the item and pays what he or she bid. Valuations are drawn from the text{uniform}(0,1)uniform(0,1) distribution. The following table depicts the valuations for each buyer in the auction. Buyer # vv 1 0.02544 2 0.02791 3 0.05930 4 0.46562 5 0.49447 6 0.50577 7 0.59270 8 0.59942 9 0.77429 10 0.84524 Assume that buyers always bid according to the relevant symmetric equilibrium bidding strategy. Round all numeric answers to at least three decimal places.Q2.42 Points At the end of the auction what is the value of the actual (not expected) revenue that the seller receives? Round your answer to at least three decimal places.

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