, to identify arguments and contrarguments for households and government for this question. you in advance The Coronavirus has already led to disruption in manufacturing output, foreign travel and
consumer demand. If travel restrictions are imposed, there will be a big fall in demand for some
sectors, especially travel and tourism. Already airlines have issued profit warnings for 2020 and
some flights have been cancelled. It will also cause a significant fall in demand for certain tourist
sights and related business. For example, London is deserted as restaurants, pubs, theatres and
other attractions are closed. This will be devastating for local business, such as taxi drivers and
gift shops who rely on tourists. In recent years, there has been a rise in self-employed workers
and workers on zero-hour contracts. This means that more workers are vulnerable to having to
take time off work. If workers can work at home or get sick pay, their income will be maintained.
But for many they could face significant falls in income from continued business restrictions.
The stock market has seen its biggest contraction since the global credit crunch. With falls of
12%. A falling stock market can cause a decline in consumer wealth and hold back spending as
people absorb the negative news. However, one study suggests falls in the stock market only
have a limited effect on reducing GDP growth. Moreover, UK average house prices increased by
8.5% over the year to December 2020, up from 7.1% in November 2020, to stand at a record
high of E252,000; this is the highest annual growth rate the UK has seen since October 2014.
This year the government is spending a staggering E280bn on measures to fight Covid-19 and its
impact on the economy including the furlough scheme. This has increased the national debt
above 100% of GDP.
4.1 With reference to the data above evaluate the likely impact on aggregate demand in the UK
economy. Illustrate your answer with a suitable diagram.
(15 )

? could I add on to with this paper? The topic I have chosen to research is how is the healthcare industry is using more resources that will benefit patients. I had previously been working in the healthcare industry for several years and became fond of the healthcare industry at an early age. Many things began to happen, including the covid-19 pandemic over the last couple of years. With limited resources and demand overreaches supplies, medical supplies become a problem. According to the article Resource Allocation in Healthcare: Implications of Model of Medicine as a Profession “A major reason for this is that the discussion has focused exclusively on the nature and status of the material resources and that the nature and role of the medical profession have been entirely ignored. Because physicians are gatekeepers to healthcare resources, their role in allocation is central from a process perspective. This article identifies 3 distinct interpretations of the nature of medicine, shows how each mandates a different method of allocation and argues that unless an appropriate model of medicine is developed that acknowledges the valid points contained in each of the 3 approaches, the allocation problem will remain unsolvable.

You have been hired as an economic consultant to a firm that is trying figure out how to set their prices. 2.   using economic terms, explain the problems or the flawed logic in the situation 3.   Evaluate the flawed decision or action and offer a strategic plan 4.   Demonstrate a graph and change in manipulation( increase, decrease, change price.) FIRM 5
Dear Economist,
I probably should have written sooner, but I’ve been too busy eating
some of my delicious new ice cream OrangeMintChocolateJellyBean. It’s
going to be HUGE! Anyway, I’m writing you because I think my Ice Cream
Shop is in in trouble. Normally, I sell around 100 gallons of ice cream a
month at about $5 a gallon. There was one summer when, for the same
price, I sold 200 gallons for a while – not sure why that happened though.
do you think? concerns me now is that the price of freezers –
obviously where people put their ice cream – has tripled in my neighborhood.
People are combining freezers with their neighbors and freezer space is at a
premium. My thought was to double the price of my ice cream so that when
people bought it, they’d want to take more care of it. To make matters
worse, my top ice cream maker left to join Ben and Jerry’s and I have a
bunch of novices who don’t produce as much! is likely to happen with
both of these things going on at the same time? Is there any hope?
Creamily yours,
Neo Politan

with this Game Theory question. Question: Consider there is a factory with two workers. Suppose that in a month, their
supervisor assigns two tasks. The two workers are tempted to slack off on the first task. Each
worker believes that with probability 7! their supervisor monitors. If the supervisor monitors and
a worker slacks, he certainly figures out that the worker is being lazy. We assume that the
supervisor monitors the first task if and only if he monitors the second task. – Each worker’s payoff to being caught slacking is —s with s > 0 – Each worker’s payoff to working hard is 0 – Each worker’s payoff to slack without being caught is 1
If a worker is found out slacking on the first task, then both workers figures that their supervisor
monitors and they will definitely not slack on the second task. If at least one of the workers slacks on the first task successfully, then the workers both know that their supervisor will not
monitor. If neither worker slack on the first task, each still believes that with probability 7: their
supervisor will monitor. Hence, a worker slacks on the second task if —n’s + 1 — 11: > 0 and does
not slack if —1rs + 1 — 1! < 0, having an expected payoff of max (—rrs + 1 — s, 0). Think of this scenario as a strategic game in which both workers make decision on slacking on
the first task. For instance, if a worker slacks on the first task, then the worker is caught with
probability it and the worker does not slack on the second task. The probability of a worker
slacking on the first task without being caught is 1 — It, in which case the worker continues to
slack on the second task. Hence, the expected payoff to the worker if he slacks on the first task is
1r(—s + 0) + (1 — 1r)(1 + 1) = —1rs + 2(1 — 1!), independent ofthe other worker’s action.
Find the mixed Nash equilibrium of this game (depending on n and s). Then consider if the
existence of the workmate makes it more likely that the workers choose to slack on the first
task.

5 Take-it or Leave-it – 2.5 points Player 1 (P1) has an object to sell, worth $0 to him and $9 to the potential buyer (P2). P1 makes a take-
it-or-leave offer at the price, p, that P2 can either accept (in which case he buys the object at price p) or
reject (in which case the game ends and the object is not sold). (a) are the Nash equilibrium strategies for each player? (%point) (b) Now assume that P2 may be a spiteful player (type — or), who rejects prices that he considers “too
high”. Specifically, a type — on P2 incurs a spite cost a:(p — (9 — 17)) = a(2p — 9) from accepting
prices 19 2 4.5. Calculate the highest price pa. that a type — or P2 should be willing to accept (your
answer should depend on or). (époént) (c) Assume that a. type—a P2 follows the optimal strategy from part (b): he accepts any price p 5 pm
and rejects prices p > pa. Assume also that P1 knows this. However, P1 is uncertain about how
Spiteful P2 is, and believes that his Spite parameter a is drawn from a uniform distribution on
[0, 1]. Prove/explain that if P1 ofi’ers a price p E [6, 9], he expects it to be accepted with probability Preazp)=1=r(as (You are being asked to explain each of these: (i) why P2 will accept ifl’ he is a type a: for whom
p 5 pa; (ii) then show that this inequality 1) S 13,, rearranges (if you did part (b) correctly) to
the inequality (1 3 $29; (iii) then explain the final equality in the above expression, recalling
that the uniform distribution means note that for a uniform on [0, 1], and for any x 6 [0,1], Pr(a g m) = :12). (%poént) (d) Write out Pl’s cumulative prospective utility from offering a price p E [6, 9], call it W03), assuming
that he cares only about the amount of money earned during the sale, and gets utility fi if he
earns m in the sale.1 Quaint)